Listened to this great podcast from Needlestack on why Russian disinformation is effective even if it’s not sophisticated. You can watch the episode below or go to the podcast here.
Christopher Paul, featured in the podcast, also has written a couple of articles for RAND, with Miriam Mathews, on identifying & countering Russian disinformation in the US and Europe.
The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model (Rand.org)
Understanding and Defending Against Russia's Malign and Subversive Information Efforts in Europe (Rand.org)
I highly recommend giving both articles a read and listening to the podcast above; especially as we are entering a busy season of countering Russian propaganda. Between their invasion of Ukraine & the 2022 Midterm elections here in the United States, Russian bot farms & apologists have been actively spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda on social media.
Drs. Paul & Mathews have developed a distinctive model of modern/contemporary Russian propaganda which they named, ‘The Firehose of Falsehood.’
The Firehose of Falsehood
High-volume and multichannel
Rapid, continuous, and repetitive
Lacks commitment to objective reality
Lacks commitment to consistency.
Most psychological warfare operations rely on three things: truth, consistency, & credibility. With the advent of social media & the active measures that were & have continued to be witnessed since the 2012 Presidential Election, Russian disinformation has given those three traditional principles the boot.
This firehose will often take susceptible victims (which we all can be) and douse them with falsehood and more falsehoods until they think the quantity of opinions shouting the same thing equals the truth (i.e., “Can these many people be wrong?”) This lie that is believed is then stored in their worldview, or narrative, and those who try to debunk it have a much harder time to convince the lie believer of the truth. The lie-deceived will then take their “truth” and speak it to others who have other similar views & traits (political affiliation, race, religion, financial status, education, etc.) so they too can have the truth.
The prime example in the last 5 years was the rise of the “QAnon” narrative along with the growth of the MAGA (“Make America Great Again”) Movement which overtook the Republican party in the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump in 2016. There have been no definitive links to QAnon as a Russian disinformation job, but Russia has officially (& unofficially) amplified the voices in the movement through social media and other media sources like RT (a Russian state-sponsored news organization).1 This continued through the 2020 election and the continual belief in it's illegitimacy. If you don't think that benefits Russia and their attempt to divide the United States against itself, you may need to check your information sources.
So how do we counter it?
We are not optimistic about the effectiveness of traditional counterpropaganda efforts. Certainly, some effort must be made to point out falsehoods and inconsistencies, but the same psychological evidence that shows how falsehood and inconsistency gain traction also tells us that retractions and refutations are seldom effective. Especially after a significant amount of time has passed, people will have trouble recalling which information they have received is the disinformation and which is the truth. Put simply, our first suggestion is don't expect to counter the firehose of falsehood with the squirt gun of truth.
Drs. Paul & Mathews due to their research are less apt to believe that traditional approaches to counter propaganda will be successful in this day & age against the Russian firehose of falsehood. Their first suggestion is to get out in front of it. Forewarning is “reading the tea leaves” also known as intelligence gathering on the who, what, when, where and why’s of the next steps in Russian disinformation. The United States and NATO did exactly this in the lead-up to the most recent phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For weeks leading up to the invasion, the United States intelligence community would give public warnings on the pretenses Russia would use for an invasion and the invasion itself. This allowed more people (but not all) to see the falsehood of Russia’s propaganda for their reasoning for the invasion.
But what do we do when we can’t get in front of it? These are their suggestions:
Countering the Effects of the Propaganda, rather than the Propaganda itself
The propagandists are working to accomplish something. The goal may be a change in attitudes, behaviors, or both. Identify those desired effects and then work to counter the effects that run contrary to your goals.
Don't direct your flow of information directly back at the firehose of falsehood Point your stream at whatever the firehose is aimed at, and try to push that audience in more productive directions.
Increase the flow of persuasive information and start to compete, seeking to generate effects that support U.S. and NATO objectives
This one speaks for itself - be louder, more persuasive, and use your tools available to drown out the firehose of falsehood
A great example of this is NAFO & the Fellas on Twitter. NAFO (North Atlantic Fellas Organization) is home-grown, civilian-run counterpropaganda & anti-Russian movement featuring grown men with Shibes in different outfits. It has been hugely successful in aggravating Russian spokespeople & diplomats and providing counter-propaganda against the Russian narrative online. You can read more about them here.
Use various technical means to turn off (or turn down) the flow
As they say in their article:
If the firehose of falsehood is being employed as part of active hostilities, or if counterpropaganda efforts escalate to include the use of a wider range of information warfare capabilities, then jamming, corrupting, degrading, destroying, usurping, or otherwise interfering with the ability of the propagandists to broadcast and disseminate their messages could diminish the impact of their efforts. Anything from aggressive enforcement of terms of service agreements with Internet providers and social media services to electronic warfare or cyberspace operations could lower the volume—and the impact—of Russian propaganda.
In conclusion, be on guard and keep an eye out for those things that just seem to confirm your worldview, especially if it is a) pro-Russian b) anti-NATO c) anti-Ukrainian, or d) compares both parties in the conflict as the same. It’s understandable in a free society to have differing ideas, however, Russia has proven to take those, amplify them as irrevocable differences, & attempt to divorce our society from each other, as they attempt to rise again to superpower status.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/02/ukraine-biolabs-conspiracy-theory-qanon/
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/popular-podcasters-spread-russian-disinformation-about-ukraine-biolabs/